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Revisiting Strategic Cyberwar Theory – Reaching Decisive 
Strategic Outcome 
 
Introduction 
Each strategy has a foundation – an overarching way of explaining why things are the 
way we see them and how to successfully reach our goals. Therefore, strategy is theory-based 
because theory provides an intellectual framework for predicting outcomes leading to the end 
goal the strategy pursues. This article will present a theory – strategic cyberwar theory – that 
states that the utility of strategic cyberwar is tied to the likelihood of institutional instability in 
the targeted nation. In an ideal scenario, the cyber attacks are systematically attacking the 
targeted adversary’s institutions triggering the dormant entropy embedded in a nation with weak 
institutions. This will lead to submission to foreign policy and intent.   
The current alternative to strategic cyberwar theory is to unsystematically attack the 
adversary with cyber attacks where exploitation opportunities occur, which is likely to degrade 
parts of the information infrastructure, but it will not reach any strategic goals. If an adversarial 
society is unaffected by a cyber conflict, the conflict itself has not reached a decisive outcome, 
and results only in tit-for-tat game or stalemate. How do we achieve a decisive outcome? How 
do we win a cyberwar?    
In strategic cyberwar theory1, the concept is to cyber attack the core of the institutional 
framework of the adversarial nation in pursuit of destabilization. The theory’s predictive power 
is strongest when applied to targeting authoritarian regimes, and dysfunctional failed 
democracies, because the common tenet is weak institutions.2 Fully functional democracies or 
constitutional monarchies, on the other hand, have in cyberwar a definite advantage because 
these advanced societies have stabile and by their citizenry accepted institutions. Nations openly 
adversarial are in most cases totalitarian states that are also close to entropy and disorder. The 
reason why these totalitarian states are under their current regime is suppression of the popular 
will. Any removal of the pillars of suppression, by destabilizing the regime design and 
institutions that make it functional, will release the popular will. A destabilized and possibly 
imploding Iranian regime is a far more tangible threat to the ruling Iranian elite than military 
information subsystems being hacked.  
Theory is an overarching way of combining ideas, phenomena, and facts, in a 
generalized form, to seek to explain specific outcomes. Theory’s strongest tenet is 
predictability. Theory can serve as a guidance to prepare for future events and ensure that these 
outcomes are favorable.  
In a militarized Internet it is convenient to lean towards traditional military theory 
transposed into cyber. Traditional military theory applied in cyber struggles with four 
challenges – anonymity, object permanence3, measurable results, and rapid digital execution. In 
a Clausewitzian world, these challenges were non-existent. First, the enemy was clearly marked. 
A state of war was declared. A French Napoleonic general overlooking the battle could clearly 
distinguish a thin red line of British troops waiting from the advancing French Guards in blue 
uniforms. There was a basic understanding of who were the parties in the conflict, their past 
actions, and the strategy that drove their action. Next challenge for traditional military strategy 
is object permanence.4 The general could march with his armies to a point where he the next 
day will fight the battle and on a map lay out his course of action. The landscape would be intact 
the next day, the roads had not moved, and the hills stood where they should. If there is no 
object permanence, maneuvering concepts5 becomes irrelevant because the maneuver is a 
positioning to increase the opportunity for success – and if we are unable to relate in time and 
space maneuvering is nullified. A third challenge is quantifiable results. Measurable results are 
needed as information for further decision-making and battle assessment. Cyber lacks the 
feedback loop of quantifiable results and with no measure of effectiveness the next move in 
traditional military theory cannot be executed according to the theory – because it relies on a 
chain of events leading to a decisive moment. The famous OODA-loop (Observe, Orient, 
Decide, Act) for decision making does not work when several steps are missing.   Computers at 
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war does not engage at human speed, the future engagements occur at computational speed 
would eradicate any influence of real-time human leadership. The uniqueness of cyber removes 
the predictive power of traditional military strategy.    
Going from the Unknown to the Known 
If battle results cannot be quantified, there is no object permanence, and the assumed 
enemy is anonymous, and the battle occur at computational speed – any grander battle strategy 
is becoming inferences about the unknown. Strategic cyberwar theory6 utilize the thinking of 
Bertrand Russell in his version of Occam’s razor; "Whenever possible, substitute constructions 
out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities."7 Occam’s razor is named after the 
medieval philosopher and friar William of Ockham who stated that in uncertainty the fewer 
assumption the better and pursuing simplicity by relying on the known until simplicity could be 
traded for greater explanatory power. What is the basic knowledge we have with least 
uncertainties?  
Societies are engaged in conflicts. The main building block for any society is 
institutions. The institutional resilience varies by nation, from stabile democracies to totalitarian 
states on the brink to entropy, and the destabilization effort need to reach the whole society with 
an intensity reaching beyond the targeted nation’s resiliency.   
If institutions fail, society will be destabilized and weakened. A destabilized society 
collapses or is subdued to foreign power. Following the stated known, strategic cyberwar theory 
seeks to explain how an adversarial society can be destabilized and subdued by a major cyber 
campaign.  Cyberwar must be quickly executed and unprecedented in the aim of the attack. The 
reason is the opportunity to shock the targeted society and in the same moment avoid adaptive 
behavior that mitigates the damages from the attacks. The rapid execution denies the targeted 
nation the opportunity to create defensive measures and evaporate any possibility to 
strategically lead the cyber defense.  
An attack will fail to destabilize the targeted society if the institutions are intact after the 
attack – or able to operate in a degraded environment. Therefore, it is important to ensure that 
the attack is of the magnitude that is forces the targeted society over the threshold to entropy.8  
The risk of seeing the world emerging as a mechanical part of the world before assumes 
that the environment it is submerged in will not change. The trap that is created by path 
dependency and tradition can be presented by another word – assumption.  
The main risk, I argue in the current cyber discourse focusing on cyber as purely an enabler of 
joint operations is the numerous assumptions built in and these assumptions are products of 
tradition burdened perceptions, lacking understanding of the reversed asymmetry of the conflict, 
where a state can attack a domestic public entity and down to the single citizen, the absence of 
object permanence, absence of acceptance of the rapid time frame interchanges will occur, and 
the impact of artificial intelligence in combination with automated harvest of vulnerabilities.  
If cyber is limited to only be enabler, other operational intent will drive the execution 
towards the strategic goal. I argue that cyber offers a strategic opportunity that will grow the 
coming decades.  
Strategic Cyberwar Theory 
If states seek to conduct decisive cyberwar it will not be achieved by anecdotal exploits, 
but instead by launching a systematic destabilizing attacks on the targeted society. In strategic 
cyberwar theory the intellectual works of Dwight Waldo are utilized, meanwhile Waldo studied 
the theoretical underpinnings to maintain government institutional sustainability and stability, 
strategic cyberwar theory turn these theories upside down to create entropy and destabilization. 
The systematic approach seeks to use institutional weaknesses, popular sentiment, and 
underlying opposition to the targeted government as force multipliers to the effect. The targeting 
can induce a sense of lack of control and failure to safe-guard their citizenry. 9 A nation, or any 
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societal structure, is organized through institutional arrangement. These arrangements require a 
set of basic functionalities to operate within the institution to ensure the continued stability and 
functionality. Institutions make a state stable, a government sustainable and functional, even in a 
degraded environment. Each country is unique in its institutional arrangements and the societal 
importance of these arrangements.  
A systematic institutional cyber attack can be visualized as the collapse of a building 
built with prefabricated elements, such as a parking garage, on a framework of concrete beams, 
pillars and decking. If pressure is distributed evenly over the construction, as an early morning 
rain, there is no risk for a collapse. The building is safe. If instead the energy is concentrated on 
one or a set of the bearing elements of the building it will collapse. Dwight Waldo’s theoretical 
work explained what makes a nation state stable.10 The strategic cyberwar theory turns Waldo’s 
accepted theories upside down, so instead of upholding the functionality of the targeted society 
it seeks to swiftly destabilize the targeted society. Waldo named five factors – legitimacy, 
authority, knowledge management, bureaucratic control, and confidence. Authority could then 
be external authority, by leading or in some cases suppressing a people, and internal authority 
within the bureaucracy and political structure.  
Waldo’s Five Pillars for Societal Stability  
Waldo’s five factors legitimacy, authority, knowledge, control, and confidence 
summarize the pillars of any society and government. If a major automated attack can 
undermine these pillars the targeted society are either weakened or at risk to implode. 
Legitimacy includes not only that the government is legally legitimized, but capable and 
focused on an intention to deliver the “good society” or in a dictatorship “acceptable society”. 
Legitimacy is a sliding grey-scale and cannot be seen as a value that the society either has or 
not. Authority is the ability to implement policy. In a democracy or constitutional monarchy, it 
requires the acceptance of the people based on rationalism, expectations of public good, ethics, 
and institutional contexts. Knowledge is institutional knowledge, the ability to arrange and 
utilize knowledge within the bureaucracy since coordination is the major challenge in 
knowledge management. Control is the ability to control what we want to control in the 
bureaucracy. Confidence is the trust people have that government delivers the expected benefits 
and the removal of fear for the future. According to Waldo, feelings of vulnerability and fear of 
future events are the absence of confidence in government. 
These five factors are the framework that holds a government together. If depleted and 
removed the absence of the factors will disintegrate government. In strategic cyber warfare it is 
pivotal to remove any of these pillars, leading to the collapse of the other, and damage the 
targeted society.  
Legitimacy concerns not who can lead but who can govern. Waldo believed that we 
need faith in government; for government to have a strong legitimacy it has to project, deliver, 
and promise that life would be better for citizens. For a major automated attack seeking to 
damage legitimacy in a state it has to darken the future for the population, create a notion that 
the leadership are unable to govern the country to a better position for the individual, and that 
the current regime create undue burdens for the citizens.  
Authority in totalitarian regimes can be summarized as acceptance for the moment. 
Authority and hierarchy are linked when the structure of the hierarchy determines the authority 
of a specific position. If there is no hierarchy, there is no leadership that can be held accountable 
for its actions; with no accountability, any organization would fall into entropy and anarchy.  
One of the major challenges for modern government is knowledge management. If 
public administrators are unable to organize knowledge and information, the public is left with 
the impression that the government is incompetent. This is an indirect challenge to authority and 
could lead to societal entropy. A modern society generates massive amounts of information at 
all levels. If a lack of knowledge and coordination affects citizens, it undermines their 
perception of how well government is working. Cyberattacks on knowledge management will 
cripple the bureaucracy and anger the population.   
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Complex organizations have problems with bureaucracy as they grow in size and 
complexity. Control can also be lost because of a lack of coordination among agencies, local 
and state governments, and other stakeholders. When government does not have control across 
organizations, jurisdiction is lost. As bureaucracy expands, so do the control issues since control 
requires coordination. Control issues also arise through unintentional errors. If control is lost 
corruption, favoritism, public theft, and popular discontent will follow.   
Waldo connected the words secure and confidence when he described his confidence 
problem. When people feel secure, they have confidence and are optimistic about the future; 
they trust government will provide support. Confidence for Dwight Waldo was trust in 
government to deliver the society it promised. Confidence means that the future is perceived to 
be brighter than the past; legitimacy and authority is defined in the present, confidence is 
forward looking. Emerging events of scarcity and competition for public resources is harmful to 
confidence in government, because it challenges future ability to serve citizens. Signs of 
systematic failure and projected inability will harm the citizenry’s ability to maintain confidence 
in government. If several of these five pillars for societal stability are damaged it can lead to 
system collapse and the downfall of a regime.  
Examples of Targeting  
Strategic cyberwar theory predicts the weaknesses of the targeted government – in the 
pursuit of remotely initiated regime shift or submission to foreign power. These weaknesses are 
identified in each society based on the societal characteristics and tenets. Once the weaknesses 
are identified they are aligned with the theory and operationalized to targeting. The attack in 
these sectors is likely unexpected by the targeted nation. These targets selected by strategic 
cyberwar theory differ in several cases from the traditionally prioritized assets for national cyber 
security and information assurance, such as military, defense-industrial, diplomatic, and 
executive information assets.  
An example is a one-party dictatorship that has successfully politically survived by 
providing consumption and financial progress to the vocal part of its citizenry. The one-party 
dictatorship has a set of unique tenets. The government is highly centralized and rule from a set 
of iconic building structures. Building sector and real estate has been booming where money is 
funneled through informal banking institutions, which operate outside of the party-controlled 
system, and the money have provided mortgages. The informal banking sector is an inviting 
target opportunity.11 All banks are a database that sorts out who owes who and who can 
establish a demand. A database can be destroyed or corrupted. The unleashed entropy by 
systematically bold and swiftly attacking the informal banking system is likely to be extremely 
high.  
The one-party dictatorship relies on pay-outs to loyalists, which then becomes a target 
with corrupted payments. The identification process is vital for strategic cyberwar theory.     
 
 
EXEMPLE OF TARGETING MATRIX - ADVERSARIAL ONE PARTY 
DICTATORSHIP 
Waldo’s Five Factors Example of Targets 
Legitimacy Deny Electricity for Iconic Administrative 
Centers  
Authority National Police Information Sharing 
Dissemination of Loyalist Informers’ 
Personal Data 
Institutional knowledge  Real-Estate/Cadastral Data Corrupting Land 
Ownership Information 
Destruction of Permit Databases 
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Control Corruption of Government Salary Pay-Outs  
Degrade the Blocking Operations that 
Prevent Access to the Complete Internet 
Confidence Informal Banking Institutions 
For the attacker, the keys to success for implementation and use of strategic cyberwar 
theory are the pre-planning and mapping of the institutional design and weaknesses of the future 
targeted society. The swiftness is important to avoid any adaptive behavior in the targeted state. 
The modernized countries have a corporate and federal culture of rapid patch management, 
following the different information security management structures and protocols in place, but 
the potential adversarial nations are less able to patch their networks in time. The rapid 
execution of the attack ensures that the feedback loop generated by the attack do not generate a 
healing of the systems – due to the fact that the patch management in place is too unstructured, 
driven by commands instead of delegated initiative, and therefore lack rapid response.  
Conclusions 
The core claim is that cyber will be a way to reach geopolitical goals in the future by 
destabilizing adversarial nations. Strategic cyberwar theory is a tool to exploit the weaknesses in 
adversarial states – if needed. Eventually, cyber will be able to catapult adversarial countries 
into entropy by creating a system chock to the institutional framework that holds these countries 
together. As stated, traditional military theory applied in cyber struggles with four challenges – 
anonymity, object permanence, measurable results, and rapid execution. If traditional military 
thinking is utilized to formulate a strategy, it is likely that the result would aggregate spurious 
assumptions and remove the opportunity for decisive offensive cyber operations as a 
geopolitical toolset. Strategic cyberwar theory is viewing the adversarial nation as a framework 
of institutional arrangements instead of a set of military assets and digital networks. The 
institutional frameworks are likely to be less well defended as the industrial-military complex, 
but when destabilized these frameworks removes the underpinnings for the adversarial regime 
leading the way to a decisive end to the cyber conflict. The theory also argues that the attacks 
have to occur in a limited time frame to ensure system chock in the targeted society.  
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